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BLURRED LINES: DISPARATE IMPACT AND 
DISPARATE TREATMENT CHALLENGES TO 
SUBJECTIVE DECISIONS—THE CASE OF 




Subjective employment decisions may be challenged under 
disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and/or disparate 
impact (the discriminatory consequences of a neutral policy) theo-
ries of discrimination. However, these theories and supporting 
evidence often are conflated when the criteria for selecting employees 
are ill-defined or unrecorded. In those instances, the process by 
which employees are selected merges with the selections themselves, 
these legal theories converge as well. This Article critically discusses 
how courts have struggled to distinguish these theories in cases 
alleging a discriminatory reduction in force. It suggests how these 
cases should be submitted to juries, to preserve the liability and 
remedies specific to each theory. 
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INTRODUCTION
 In Ricci v. DeStefano,1 the Supreme Court considered the 
conflict that arises when an employer, fearing disparate impact 
liability as a result of its screening examination process, acts on 
race-conscious grounds to deprive white employees of promotions 
they otherwise would receive.2 The Court resolved that conflict 
by holding that the employer’s actions would be justified only if 
there was a “strong basis in evidence” that, by failing to act, the 
employer would be exposed to disparate impact liability.3 This 
Article considers another juncture at which these theories of dis-
crimination collide, and illustrates the resulting conflict in the 
case of a reduction in force, or, RIF. 
 The conflict arises in the following circumstance. Suppose 
an employer instructs its managers to rely on their subjective 
assessment of an employee’s past performance and career poten-
tial, and identify those to be riffed.4 The employer then adopts 
the managers’ RIF recommendations. A riffed employee alleges the 
employer’s decision was intentionally discriminatory, subjecting 
the employee to unlawful disparate treatment; the employee also 
alleges the employer’s decision effected a disparate impact, un-
der both Title VII5 and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA).6 The question addressed here is whether those alle-
gations are mutually exclusive. This Article discusses how courts 
have dealt with similar cases at the intersections of these theo-
ries and recommends how these issues should be submitted to 
the finder of fact.7
1 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
2 Id. at 562–63. 
3 Id. at 563.
4 “Riffed” refers to the action of ending an employee’s employment through 
a reduction in force action. Summary of Reduction in Force Under OPM’s 
Regulation, OFF. PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/work 
force-restructuring/reductions-in-force/#url=Summary [https://perma.cc/7D2F 
-LZ6E] (“In the Federal Government, layoffs are called reduction in force (RIF) 
actions. When an agency must abolish positions, the RIF regulations deter-
mine whether an employee keeps his or her present position, or whether the 
employee has a right to a different position.”). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
6 29 U.S.C. § 621. 
7 See infra Part V.
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 Further underscoring the tension between these two claims 
is, in the RIF hypothetical above (and as is common), managers 
record only their ultimate RIF/no RIF decisions; there is no tan-
gible evidence from which a fact-finder can review the weight a 
manager gave to an employee’s performance because there is no 
ascertainable “rating” assigned to individual employee performance 
motivating the RIF selection.8 Under these circumstances, courts 
are likely to deem the impact of each selection criterion “not ca-
pable of separation for analysis” for purposes of proving a dis-
parate impact claim.9 As a result, the sole indication of how an 
employee fared under this hypothetical selection system is whether 
the employee was riffed.10
 Whether the employer’s decision resulted from its ostensi-
bly neutral criteria (the contention in a disparate impact case)11 or 
the biased decisions of the managers who apply those criteria 
(the contention in a disparate treatment case)12 thus is unknow-
able from data regarding the ultimate RIF selections.13 Under 
each theory—disparate impact and disparate treatment—the data 
analysis will be the same: a comparison of the demographics of 
the workforce before and after the RIF.14 In such cases, the same 
bottom-line statistical result may be used to bolster either theory 
of discrimination, blurring the legal distinction between them.15
8 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982); N.Y.C. Transit 
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585–86 (1979). 
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (“[I]f the complaining party can 
demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking 
process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process 
may be analyzed as one employment practice.”); see, e.g., Grant v. Metro. Gov’t of 
Nashville, 446 F. App’x 737, 740 (6th Cir. 2011). 
10 See § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i); see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 442; Beazer, 440 U.S. 
at 585–86; supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
11 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988) (plurality 
opinion). 
12 Id. at 986. 
13 Id. at 1002.
14 See Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921, 924 (7th Cir. 1982) (relying 
upon the same statistical evidence to analyze a disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact claim). 
15 See Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title 
VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 305, 321–22 (1983). 
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I. THE ELEMENTS OF A DISPARATE IMPACT CASE
 The Supreme Court first recognized Title VII’s prohibition 
of disparate impact discrimination in 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Company.16 Griggs concerned the lawfulness of an employer’s 
requirement of a high school education and the passing of an in-
telligence test as a condition of employment or transfer between 
departments.17 Finding these requirements disproportionately 
excluded black applicants from the positions they sought, the 
Court found these practices violated Title VII, absent proof these 
criteria were related to job performance.18 Whether these prac-
tices were intended to be exclusionary was irrelevant.19
 The Griggs court had no reason to define a “practice” that 
could result in disparate impact discrimination because the degree 
and testing requirements were clearly evident and undisputed.20
Nearly two decades later the Court addressed the importance of 
identifying a facially neutral practice in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
and Trust.21 In prior cases, the Court had no trouble concluding that 
height and weight requirements,22 methadone use,23 and resi-
dency requirements24 could provide the foundation for disparate 
impact claims. Watson required the Court to consider whether, in 
addition to these objective requirements, a subjective criterion 
also could be the focus of a disparate impact claim.25
 Seven Justices answered affirmatively, although the por-
tion of Justice O’Connor’s opinion that describes the contours of that 
claim garnered only a four-justice plurality.26 Nevertheless, Watson
has been highly influential in shaping subsequent litigation, and 
many of the plurality’s views were ratified the following term by a 
Court majority in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.27 A portion 
16 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
17 Id. at 427–28. 
18 Id. at 432. 
19 Id.
20 Id. at 427. 
21 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
22 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). 
23 See N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590–91 (1979). 
24 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 312 (1977). 
25 Watson, 487 U.S. at 989. 
26 Id. at 977–78. 
27 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989). 
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of Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Watson addresses the 
concern that vetting the impact of myriad subjective practices 
will be so daunting for employers, they will have no recourse but to 
default to quotas, to ensure subjective decisions result in propor-
tional outcomes.28 Quotas, of course, are prohibited by Title VII.29
Justice O’Connor sought to allay fears that employment decisions 
would improperly focus on bottom-line statistics by highlighting 
the substantial hurdles a disparate impact plaintiff must overcome 
to prevail on a subjective theory—in other words, she opined that 
proof of an overall statistical disparity should not suffice30:
The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employ-
ment practice that is challenged. Although this has been rela-
tively easy to do in challenges to standardized tests, it may 
sometimes be more difficult when subjective selection criteria 
are at issue. Especially in cases where an employer combines 
subjective criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules 
or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating 
and identifying the specific employment practices that are al-
legedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.31
 Justice O’Connor found in Connecticut v. Teal32 support 
for her view that a disparate impact must be directly tied to the 
disparity caused by a discrete aspect of the selection process.33
In Teal, the employer could not defend the disparate pass-rate 
on a written promotion test by pointing to the “bottom line” pro-
portional racial representation of the employees at issue.34 Jus-
tice O’Connor applied that same principle in reverse—neither can 
a plaintiff rely on bottom-line differences as evidence to support 
a claim that a subjective decision or process caused a disparate 
28 Watson, 487 U.S. at 993. 
29 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978). 
30 Watson, 487 U.S. at 993–94. 
31 Id. at 994. 
32 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 460 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
34 See id. at 452 (“In sum, respondents’ claim of disparate impact from the 
examination, a pass-fail barrier to employment opportunity, states a prima 
facie case of employment discrimination under § 703(a)(2), despite their em-
ployer’s nondiscriminatory ‘bottom line,’ and that ‘bottom line’ is no defense 
to this prima facie case under § 703(h).”). 
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impact.35 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the disparity was 
caused by an identifiable step in the selection process.36
 As described by Justice O’Connor in Watson:
Once the employment practice at issue has been identified, 
causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must offer sta-
tistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that 
the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants 
for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a pro-
tected group.37
Having identified the challenged practice, the plaintiff must adduce 
statistical evidence regarding the impact of that particular prac-
tice, rather than merely pointing to an overall disproportionality 
resulting from the entire decision-making process.38 Accordingly, 
RIF statistics conflating the impact of a multifaceted employee 
selection process generally should be deemed insufficient, because 
aggregate statistical analysis does not isolate and identify the 
specific employment practice that caused the disparate impact.39
 An important exception to this general rule was created 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which Congress passed in direct 
response to Wards Cove Packing Co.40 The Act codified a disparate 
35 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982). 
36 See generally Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 140 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]o establish a prima facie case of disparate impact in a Title 
VII case, a plaintiff must (1) identify a specific employment policy or practice 
of the employer and (2) proffer evidence, typically statistical evidence, (3) of a 
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused 
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions (4) because of their membership 
in a protected group .... With respect to meeting her burden with respect to 
(3), a plaintiff will typically have to demonstrate that the disparity in impact 
is sufficiently large that it is highly unlikely to have occurred at random, and 
to do so by using one of several tests of statistical significance. There is no 
precise threshold that must be met in every case, but a finding of statistical 
significance with a probability level at or below 0.05, or at 2 to 3 standard 
deviations or greater, will typically be sufficient.” (citations omitted)). 
37 Watson, 487 U.S. at 994; see also N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 
U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (“A prima facie violation of the Act may be established 
by statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of 
denying members of one race equal access to employment opportunities.”). 
38 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994. 
39 See Teal, 457 U.S. at 458. 
40 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). In discussing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court remarked that “[o]ne of the purposes of 
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impact cause of action and included, as an affirmative defense, 
that a plaintiff is excused from identifying a particular criterion 
causing the disparate impact by proving the selection criteria are 
incapable of “separation for analysis.”41 In that event, the decision-
making process may be analyzed in terms of the bottom line.42
Importantly, this exception does not apply to the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, which remains subject to the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in Watson and Wards Cove.43
II. “PATTERN OR PRACTICE” AS A METHOD OF PROVING 
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
 The Supreme Court, in International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States,44 approved pattern or practice evidence as 
a means of proving systemic intentional discrimination, or stated 
differently, disparate treatment.45 In a pattern or practice case, a 
plaintiff’s burden is to establish that the discrimination complained 
of is the employer’s “standard operating procedure”—its usual, 
rather than an exceptional, way of doing business.46 Typically, this 
that amendment was to modify the Court’s holding in Wards Cove Packing 
Co. v. Atonio ... a case in which we narrowly construed the employer’s exposure 
to liability on a disparate-impact theory.” Id. See also Niall A. Paul, Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: The Supreme Court’s Disparate Treatment of the 
Disparate Impact Doctrine, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 127, 158 (1990). 
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
42 Id.
43 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (“While the relevant 1991 amendments [to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964] expanded the coverage of Title VII, they did not 
amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination. Hence, Wards 
Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical language remains appli-
cable to the ADEA.”). 
44 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
45 Id. at 361. In the case of private plaintiffs, this method of proof has been 
limited to class actions. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 
(1976) (“But petitioners here have carried their burden of demonstrating the 
existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern and practice by the respondents 
and, therefore, the burden will be upon respondents to prove that individuals 
who reapply were not in fact victims of previous hiring discrimination.”). Pat-
tern or practice disparate treatment claims may be brought by a plaintiff class 
that is properly certified, or, by the Attorney General or EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-6(a), (c); see also 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2:20 
(6th ed. 1994) (describing pattern or practice discrimination under Title VII). 
46 See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336. 
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proof consists of evidence of significant statistical disparities, 
coupled with anecdotal evidence that brings the statistics “con-
vincingly to life.”47 Statistical evidence, without more, will not prove 
a prima facie case.48
 Prima facie proof creates a presumption that the employ-
er’s adverse actions affecting members of the class are discrimi-
natory.49 To avoid liability to each class member, the employer must 
prove the same adverse action regarding that employee would 
have been taken notwithstanding the pattern or practice.50
 Although both pattern or practice cases and disparate im-
pact cases are heavily dependent on statistics,51 the focus of the 
statistics differs, at least in principle.52 Disparate impact statistics 
generally must target a particular facially neutral practice and 
demonstrate it results in the disproportionate selection of pro-
tected group members.53 That proof often is made with statistics 
47 Id. at 338–39 (“The Government bolstered its statistical evidence with 
the testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific instances of dis-
crimination .... But, as even our brief summary of the evidence shows, this 
was not a case in which the Government relied on ‘statistics alone.’ The indi-
viduals who testified about their personal experiences with the company 
brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.”).
48 Id. at 339–40 n.20 (“Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are 
probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a 
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination ....”); see also AFSCME v. County of 
Nassau, 96 F.3d 644, 647, 651 (2d Cir. 1996). 
49 Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359, 359 n.45. 
50 Id. at 360–62 (“At the initial, ‘liability’ stage of a pattern-or-practice suit the 
Government is not required to offer evidence that each person for whom it will ul-
timately seek relief was a victim of the employer’s discriminatory policy. Its 
burden is to establish a prima facie case that such a policy existed. The burden 
then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a pattern or 
practice by demonstrating that the Government’s proof is either inaccurate or 
insignificant. An employer might show, for example, that the claimed discrimina-
tory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimi-
nation, or that during the period it is alleged to have pursued a discriminatory 
policy it made too few employment decisions to justify the inference that it had 
engaged in a regular practice of discrimination.”).
51 See id. at 339–40 n.20; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 
U.S. 977, 987, 992, 994–95 (1988). 
52 See infra text accompanying notes 53–58. 
53 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328–31 (1977); Watson, 487 U.S. at 
994 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 
492–93 n.21 (3d Cir. 1999); Guster v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., No. 
1:02-CV-145, 2004 WL 1854181, at *27–29 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2004). 
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comparing the selection rate of a protected group to that of the 
favored group under the neutral selection criterion.54 As ex-
plained, whether selections are proportional at the “bottom line” 
generally is irrelevant.55
 In contrast, statistics supporting an alleged pattern or 
practice focus primarily on the bottom line, provided they account 
for legitimate, non-discriminatory selection criteria.56 As a result, 
simple comparisons between the demographics of those adversely 
affected relative to the pool of those at risk of adverse selection 
may be too general to be probative.57 On the other hand, analyses 
that account for the jobs employees perform, how well they per-
form, and their experience, along with other non-discriminatory 
explanations for selection, may indicate discrimination if a sig-
nificant disparity remains notwithstanding these neutral con-
siderations.58 However, distinctions between statistics probative 
of disparate impact and pattern or practice tend to vanish if the 
RIF as a whole constitutes the facially neutral practice.59 This is 
54 See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329–30. 
55 See Chamallas, supra note 15, at 311. 
56 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308, 309–13 (1977); 
Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 340–41, 355–56. 
57 See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13 (“In Teamsters, the comparison be-
tween the percentage of Negroes on the employer’s work force and the per-
centage in the general areawide population was highly probative, because the 
job skill there involved—the ability to drive a truck—is one that many per-
sons possess or can fairly readily acquire. When special qualifications are re-
quired to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather 
than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifica-
tions) may have little probative value. The comparative statistics introduced 
by the Government in the District Court, however, were properly limited to 
public school teachers, and therefore this is not a case like Mayor v. Educa-
tional Equality League ... in which the racial-composition comparisons failed 
to take into account special qualifications for the position in question.”) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
58 See generally Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (analyzing whether ADEA claim must include entire age-protected 
group—all employees over the age of forty—or, whether the plaintiffs could 
argue RIF disproportionately impacted employees over fifty); Council 31,
AFCME v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing differences be-
tween disparate impact and pattern and practice claims within the context of 
allegedly discriminatory layoff decisions). 
59 See Donaldson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 794 F. Supp. 498, 504–06, 509 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., 144 F. App’x 603, 606 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Ferrette v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 105 F. App’x 722, 725–27 (6th Cir. 
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most common when RIF decisions are largely or exclusively sub-
jective.60 The remainder of this Article addresses this intersection 
between pattern or practice and disparate impact claims when 
decisions are subjective, using RIF decisions as an example. 
III. SUBJECTIVE DECISIONS ARE NOT PER SE INSEPARABLE
 In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, an African Ameri-
can employee, applied but was rejected for four promotions to 
supervisory positions, and each time the employer selected a white 
applicant for the position.61 The Bank, which employed about eighty 
employees, “had not developed precise and formal criteria for 
evaluating candidates for the positions for which [the plaintiff] 
unsuccessfully applied.”62 Stated differently, the employer “relied 
instead on the subjective judgment of supervisors who were ac-
quainted with the candidates and with the nature of the jobs to be 
filled.”63 Further, the supervisors who made the decisions regarding 
the four promotions were white.64
 Although unremarked by Justice O’Connor, the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s opinion in Watson reveals that the plaintiff’s case is emblem-
atic of an important category of cases that arise when the selection 
process consists of both objective and subjective features.65 The 
Fifth Circuit, in reviewing the district court’s opinion, observed that 
“[t]he district court specifically credited the Bank’s assertion that it 
promoted [the white employees] rather than Watson because in 
all three instances Watson had less experience or supervisory expe-
rience than the individual chosen for promotion.”66 Further, the 
Fifth Circuit highlighted that, although the district court “noted” 
that the white employees selected for promotion over Watson 
2004); Sullivan v. Smith Filter Corp., No. 04-4045, 2005 WL 8164768, at *6, *7 
(C.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2005). 
60 See, e.g., Durante, 144 F. App’x at 605–07. 
61 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr. 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988) (plurality 
opinion). 
62 Id. at 982. 
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 798 F.2d 791, 798–99 (5th Cir. 1986), 
vacated, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
66 Id. The Fifth Circuit found the evidence regarding the fourth promotion 
was equipoised, and therefore deferred to the judgment of the district court. 
Id. at 799.
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received slightly higher or comparable performance evaluations, 
the lower court primarily emphasized the white employees’ su-
perior supervisory experience in concluding the employer had not 
engaged in unlawful discrimination.67 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit 
accepted the district court’s characterization of the selection cri-
teria as consisting of objective features—employment and supervi-
sory experience (objective dimensions), as well as performance 
evaluations (a subjective component).68 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court ultimately concluded that a subjective element in the decision 
process does not preclude a disparate impact challenge focusing 
on that subjective component.69
 If a subjective assessment is expressed as a number, for 
example, a performance rating, it is as amenable to statistical 
analysis as an objective component.70 In that event, there is no rea-
son to assess a RIF solely at “the bottom line”—that is, reviewing 
only the ultimate RIF selections as a whole—because an employee’s 
scores on the objective and subjective elements of the process are 
reported separately, and therefore capable of being separated for 
analysis.71 Further, whether subjectively rated “performance” 
adversely impacts a protected group can be determined directly.72
67 Id. at 798–99. 
68 Id.
69 Watson, 487 U.S. at 989 (“We are persuaded that our decisions in Griggs
and succeeding cases could largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were 
applied only to standardized selection practices. However one might distinguish 
“subjective” from “objective” criteria, it is apparent that selection systems that 
combine both types would generally have to be considered subjective in nature.”).
70 See Elisabeth Svensson, Guidelines to Statistical Evaluation of Data 
from Rating Scales and Questionnaires, 33 J. REHAB. MED. 47 (2001); see also 
S. S. Stevens, On the Theory of Scales of Measurement, 103 SCI. 677, 678–79
(1946). The only problem it presents is that the scoring of “performance” 
should be considered an ordinal, rather than a cardinal, scale. See Bryan 
Caplan, The Austrian Search for Realistic Foundations, 65 S. ECON. J. 823, 
827 (1999). In other words, although it makes sense to consider an employee 
whose experience is ten times greater than a comparator’s, there is no mean-
ingful sense in which an employee whose performance is rated a ten can be 
viewed as being ten times the performer as the employee who is rated a one. 
See id. However, there are standard statistical techniques for assessing the 
adverse impact of an ordinal measure. See J. Scott Granberg-Rademacker, An
Algorithm for Converting Ordinal Scale Measurement Data to Interval/Ratio 
Scale, 70 EDUC. & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 74, 74–76, 78 (2010). 
71 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; supra text accompanying note 68.  
72 See Svensson, supra note 70, at 47; see also Stevens, supra note 70, at 
678, 679. 
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In other words, “subjectivity” does not imply criteria are “un-
measurable,” and if subjective ratings are numerical or categori-
cal, such as good, better, best, they can be analyzed as readily as 
objective measures.73
 The same is true when an employer bases its layoff deci-
sions on subjective ratings of multiple employee traits.74 For exam-
ple, an employer may rate each trait on numerical scales of one 
to three in terms of potential and performance.75 This describes 
an evaluation system commonly referred to as the “9-block” sys-
tem.76 As explained by one district court: 
The chart, as the name suggests, appears graphically as a three-
by-three square containing nine blocks. The columns represent 
‘sustained performance,’ while the rows represent “employee 
potential.” Thus, the higher that a name appears, the more poten-
tial the employee is deemed to have, while the further to the 
right that a name appears, the better her performance has been. 
Each block is identified with a description, ranging from “Con-
sistent Star” in block “1” to ”Lower Performer” in block “9” in 
the lower left.77
 The adverse impact, if any, of each of these scales may be 
evaluated independently of the other, to determine if either cri-
terion—rated employee performance or rated employee poten-
tial—adversely impacts one or more demographic groups.78 The 
subjective nature of these ratings makes this no more difficult to 
quantify and analyze than if these scores derived from objective 
tests.79
73 See id. at 47; see also id. at 678, 679. 
74 See id. at 47.
75 See infra text accompanying note 77; Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08-
6292, 2014 WL 2920503, at *19 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014). See generally Succession 
Planning: What is a 9-box grid?, SHRM (Mar. 9, 2018) [hereinafter 9-Box Plan], 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/whats 
a9boxgridandhowcananhrdepartmentuseit.aspx [https://perma.cc/A6H4-3MMV]. 
76See generally 9-Box Plan, supra note 75.
77 Bell, 2014 WL 2920503, at *19. See generally 9-Box Plan, supra note 75. 
78 See Davis v. Harvey, No. 04 CV 1051, 2006 WL 2794318, at *3, *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 27, 2006); see also O’Neill v. Americold Logistics, LLC, No. H-13-0333, 
2014 WL 3795606, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. July 30, 2014); 9-Box Plan, supra note 75. 
79 See supra text accompanying note 73. Svensson, supra note 70, at 47; 
see also Stevens, supra note 70, at 678–79. 
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 A similar conclusion applies if subjective assessments are 
administered sequentially on a “pass-fail” basis.80 For example, 
suppose RIF candidates first are assessed in terms of performance, 
and those regarded as subpar are designated for layoff.81 The 
remaining group is next assessed in terms of potential.82 Those 
with the most positive assessments on this trait are retained, and 
the rest are laid off.83 At the conclusion of the RIF, it is straight-
forward to determine whether the attrition for any demographic 
group is attributable to either performance or potential.84 Although 
purely subjective, their separate impacts can be measured and 
determined.85 In general, the sequential nature of RIF decisions 
implemented in the manner described here would allow those who 
survive any stage to be compared to those who entered that same 
phase, and would permit the analysis of the associated attrition 
as a gauge of any adverse impact. Subjective practices likewise are 
separable if one set of practices succeeds the other.86 For example, 
one method of decision making may have been in effect in year 
one, and then replaced by different subjective criteria in year 
two.87 It is a simple matter to identify and segregate the deci-
sions subject to each regime. 
80 See supra text accompanying notes 68, 70–73; Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Tr., 798 F.2d 791, 798–99 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 487 U.S. 977 
(1988); Svensson, supra note 70, at 47; Stevens, supra note 70, at 678–79; see 
also U.S. OFF. PERS. MGMT., PASS/FAIL ASSESSMENT: AN OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 
2000), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/performance-management 
/reference-materials/historical/pass_fail_assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/8B65-Q3UC]. See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Comment, Differential Pass-Fail 
Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 793 (1978).  
81 See Zuniga v. Boeing Co., 133 F. App’x 570, 572–73 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Donald P. Lawless, Rigorous RIF Process Defeats Discrimination Claims, NAT’L
L. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/rigorous-rif-process  
-defeats-discrimination-claims [https://perma.cc/SG6U-M9KJ]. 
82 Zuniga, 133 F. App’x at 572–73. 
83 Beaird v. Seagate Tech. Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 1998).
84 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; Lawless, supra note 81; supra note 70; 
supra text accompanying notes 70–73. 
85 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; supra note 70; supra text accompany-
ing notes 70–73. 
86 See Watson, 798 F.2d at 798–99; supra note 70; supra text accompany-
ing notes 70–73. 
87 See, e.g., Smith v. Township of East Greenwich, 344 F. App'x 740, 742, 743 
(3d Cir. 2009); Zuniga v. Boeing Co., 133 F. App’x 570, 572–73 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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 Thus, the inability to separate the disparate impact of 
each subjective practice arises principally when the only indica-
tion of how an employee fared in a subjective evaluation is the 
employment decision itself.88 In the case of a RIF, this is the de-
cision whether to retain or lay off a particular employee.89 To il-
lustrate, suppose layoff decisions are made by a committee that 
jointly assesses employees in terms of loosely described, subjec-
tive criteria. At the end of the day, they compile a list of those 
designated for layoff, with no record of the stages at which they 
arrived at these decisions. The only objective facts are the de-
mographics of the workforce before and after these decisions. These 
groups easily are compared, but the harder question is whether 
any differences in selection rates can be challenged under a dis-
parate impact theory, rather than solely in terms of disparate 
treatment or pattern or practice of discrimination, which require 
proof of intent.90 The remainder of this Article considers whether, 
in this situation, claims of disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment are compatible. 
IV. WHY DISTINGUISH THESE THEORIES?
 Disparate impact claims, as compared to disparate treat-
ment or pattern or practice claims, provide different remedies 
and impose different burdens of proof.91 A disparate treatment 
plaintiff who prevails under Title VII may be awarded compen-
satory and punitive damages, in addition to backpay, front pay, 
and attorney’s fees.92 A prevailing disparate impact plaintiff is 
88 See Carla J. Rozycki & Emma J. Sullivan, Employees Bringing Disparate-
Impact Claims Under the ADEA Continue to Face an Uphill Battle Despite the 
Supreme Court's Decisions in Smith v. City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls 
Atomic Power Laboratory, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 8, 9–10 (2010). 
89 See, e.g., Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., 144 F. App'x 603, 604–07 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
90 See infra Parts IV–V; see also Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 626–28 (2011). 
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 
994 (1988) (plurality opinion); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 252–56 (1981); see also Davidson v. Citizens Gas & Coke Util., 470 F. 
Supp. 2d 934, 944 (S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Emp. Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 
1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). 
92 § 1981a(a).  
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limited to equitable relief.93 Additionally, a disparate treatment 
claim may be tried to a jury, and most courts hold that a disparate 
impact claim must be tried to the court.94 In effect, a disparate 
impact plaintiff bears the heavier burden of proof in establishing 
a prima facie case,95 because she first must isolate the practice 
allegedly causing a disparate impact, and then present statistical 
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 
or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... against a respondent who 
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employ-
ment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate im-
pact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act ..., 
and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under 
section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover 
compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection 
(b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent. 
Id.
93 Davidson, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 944 (“Prevailing on the issue of liability, 
however, does not automatically entitle each Plaintiff to an award of compen-
satory damages. Compensatory damages are not, as a matter of law, available as 
a remedy in a disparate impact case .... To the extent they are entitled to equitable 
relief it could come in the form of an award of back pay.” (internal citations 
omitted)); In re Emp. Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d at 1315 (“If the court 
ultimately finds that the employer has violated the disparate impact provi-
sions of Title VII, and is therefore engaged in an unlawful employment practice, 
the court may order a wide range of equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (1994).”). 
94 See, e.g., Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 143 F.3d 227, 230 n.1 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (“Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII claims could not be 
tried to a jury, and compensatory and punitive damages could not be awarded. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to allow compensatory and puni-
tive damages in cases of intentional discrimination (i.e., not in cases involving 
disparate impact only), and jury trials were permitted only in cases where 
compensatory and punitive damages were proper, in other words, in dispar-
ate treatment cases .... Therefore, a jury may not determine the disparate 
impact claim, and, if that is the only claim left, there is no need for a jury.”).
95 Massarsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 937 (1983) (“The plaintiff’s initial burden with respect to a disparate 
impact claim is heavier than it is when disparate treatment is alleged.”); see
Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1523 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Under the 
disparate impact theory, a facially neutral employment practice can be in vio-
lation of Title VII even if there is no evidence of an employer’s subjective in-
tent to discriminate. But, for disparate impact purposes, depending on the 
type of data used to compile the statistics, an allegation that there exists a 
statistical discrepancy in the racial composition of the workforce may not be 
sufficient.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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evidence regarding causation.96 However, once a plaintiff makes 
that proof, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer who 
must either produce evidence that the subjective practice either 
is job-related and consistent with business necessity, under Title 
VII, or else that it is a reasonable factor other than age, if the 
suit is under the ADEA.97
 Most pertinent to this discussion is how the theory of dis-
parate impact fares when an employee is permitted to challenge an 
entire decision-making process as an integrated whole.98 This is the 
example in which employees are selected for a reduction in force 
based solely on subjective assessments that manifest in the ul-
timate RIF decision.99 Stripped of the need to identify any element 
of the subjective process as the cause of the offending pattern of 
selections, the plaintiff may prove a prima facie case by establishing 
just one element—disproportionality, i.e., the protected group of 
which the plaintiff is a member was selected for the RIF in dis-
proportionate numbers.100 Essentially, when “subjectivity” is the 
sole offending practice, disparate impact operates as a strict lia-
bility rule.101
96 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989); Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  
97 Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 110–11 (1st Cir. 2016) (“In a 
nutshell, litigation of [a disparate impact claim] focuses on three questions: 
Do the plaintiffs show by competent evidence that the employer is utilizing 
an employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race; If 
so, does the employer show that the challenged employment practice creating 
this disparate result is nevertheless job-related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity; If so, do the plaintiffs show that the 
employer has refused to adopt an alternative practice that equally or better 
serves the employer’s legitimate business needs, yet has a lesser disparate 
impact? To prevail, plaintiffs require a ‘yes’ answer to the first question, and 
either a ‘no’ to the second question or a ‘yes’ to the third question.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (discuss-
ing ADEA’s exception permitting “reasonable factors other than age.”).
98 See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 368 (2d Cir. 1999).  
99 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988) (plu-
rality opinion). 
100 See id. at 994.
101 In tort law, strict liability is commonly referred to as “liability without 
fault.” 31A AM. JUR. 2D Explosions & Explosives § 163 (2020); Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 712, (1995) (“Strict liability 
means liability without regard to fault ....”) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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 The courts, and subsequently Congress, have constructed an 
order of proof that safeguards disparate impact claims from con-
flicting with Title VII’s prohibition against intentional discrimi-
nation—42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(j).102 That provision prevents employers 
from granting a preference to any protected group because of an 
imbalance in the employment of protected group members relative 
to their representation in the available workforce.103 This is the 
basis for prohibiting the use of quotas.104 Yet, if challengers to 
subjective employment practices are stripped of the need to identify 
a specific offending practice, and permitted to challenge the RIF as 
a whole, then as Justice O’Connor recognized in Watson, employers 
who wish to avoid potential liability will be led inevitably, overtly 
or covertly, to adopt quotas or else abandon subjective judgments.105
But, as she observed, there are many instances in which subjec-
tive judgments may be unavoidable.106
102 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584 (2009) (“[W]e adopt the strong-
basis-in-evidence standard as a matter of statutory construction to resolve any 
conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of 
Title VII.”); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 251, 258 (2005) (“Had 
Congress intended to inaugurate disparate impact liability in the ADEA, one 
would expect to find some indication of that intent in the text and the legisla-
tive history. There is none.”) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
103 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(j). 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to 
require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, 
or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchap-
ter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any 
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which 
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of 
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin em-
ployed by any employer, referred or classified for employment 
by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to 
membership or classified by any labor organization, or admit-
ted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training 
program, in comparison with the total number or percentage 
of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in 
any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available 
work force in any community, State, section, or other area.  
Id.
104 Watson, 487 U.S. at 993. 
105 Id. at 993. 
106 Id. at 999 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 
(1978)). 
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[I]t has long been recognized that legal rules leaving any class 
of employers with "little choice" but to adopt such measures 
would be "far from the intent of Title VII.” ... Allowing the 
evolution of disparate impact analysis to lead to this result 
would be contrary to Congress’ clearly expressed intent ....107
 In Watson, Justice O’Connor elaborated on the safeguards 
in Title VII intended to thwart that result.108 First is the re-
quirement that the plaintiff must specify the particular element 
of the subjective selection process that allegedly caused the dis-
parate impact.109 Requiring the plaintiff to identify a particular 
element of the selection process undermines quotas attuned to 
the “bottom line,” because liability may exist irrespective of bottom-
line parity:110
However, even if on remand respondents can show that non-
whites are underrepresented in the at-issue jobs in a manner that 
is acceptable under the standards set forth in Part II, supra,
this alone will not suffice to make out a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact. Respondents will also have to demonstrate that 
the disparity they complain of is the result of one or more of the 
employment practices that they are attacking here, specifically 
showing that each challenged practice has a significantly dis-
parate impact on employment opportunities for whites and 
nonwhites. To hold otherwise would result in employers being 
107 Id. at 993 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 
(1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). This same sentiment was echoed the follow-
ing term by Justice White:  
The Court of Appeals’ theory, at the very least, would mean that 
any employer who had a segment of his work force that was—for 
some reason—racially imbalanced, could be haled into court and 
forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of 
defending the “business necessity” of the methods used to se-
lect the other members of his work force. The only practicable 
option for many employers would be to adopt racial quotas, 
insuring that no portion of their work forces deviated in racial 
composition from the other portions thereof; this is a result 
that Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VII .... 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(j)). 
108 Watson, 487 U.S. at 993–94 (“[W]e think it imperative to explain in 
some detail why the evidentiary standards that apply in these cases should 
serve as adequate safeguards against the danger that Congress recognized.”). 
109 Id. at 994. 
110 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982). 
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potentially liable for “the myriad of innocent causes that may 
lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work 
forces.”111
Conflating subjective practices with the ultimate employment 
decision eviscerates this safeguard.112
 The requirement to identify the singular offending practice 
is even more compelling under the ADEA.113 The Supreme Court 
noted “the scope of disparate-impact liability under ADEA is 
narrower than under Title VII.”114 Thus: 
A plaintiff’s initial burden is heavier under a disparate impact 
theory than it is under a disparate treatment theory .... To plead a 
disparate impact claim under the ADEA, it is not enough to 
simply allege that there is a disparate impact on workers, or 
point to a generalized policy that leads to such an impact. Ra-
ther, the employee is responsible for isolating and identifying 
the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible 
for any observed statistical disparities. Moreover, the plaintiff 
must show that the facially neutral employment practice had 
a significantly discriminatory impact. Statistical evidence of 
this impact must be limited in scope in accordance with [Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(b)(1) and tied to the allega-
tions of plaintiff’s complaint.115
 If the plaintiff proves disproportionality, the burden of proof 
shifts to the employer, who must demonstrate that the challenged 
111 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (emphasis in original) (quoting Watson,
487 U.S. at 992). 
112 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 989. 
113 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005); see Debra Burke, 
ADEA Disparate Impact Discrimination: A Pyrrhic Victory?, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
L.J. 47, 57 (2008) (“[U]nlike Title VII, the ADEA language significantly nar-
rows its coverage by permitting any ‘otherwise prohibited’ action ‘where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.’”) (quoting Smith,
544 U.S. at 233).
114 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
115 Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 
WL 1942525, at *22 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018) (quotations and citations omitted); 
see also Powell v. Dall. Morning News L.P., 776 F. Supp. 2d 240, 265 (N.D. 
Tex. 2011) (citation omitted) (“Once Plaintiffs have carried their heavy bur-
den of isolating a specific policy and demonstrating the statistical disparate 
impact resulting from the policy, the burden shifts to the Defendants to prove 
the actions were based on reasonable factors other than age.”), aff’d, 486 F. 
App’x 469 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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practice, i.e., subjectivity, is job-related and consistent with business 
necessity, under Title VII, or a reasonable factor other than age, 
under ADEA.116 Although few cases discuss how to meet this bur-
den, Justice O’Connor’s observation in Watson is pertinent: 
It is self-evident that many jobs, for example those involving 
managerial responsibilities, require personal qualities that 
have never been considered amenable to standardized testing. 
In evaluating claims that discretionary employment practices 
are insufficiently related to legitimate business purposes, it must 
be borne in mind that “[c]ourts are generally less competent 
than employers to restructure business practices, and unless 
mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.”117
 In contrast, disparate treatment plaintiffs cannot prevail 
merely by demonstrating disproportionality; they must prove 
intent.118 Although statistics can take a plaintiff a long way, vir-
tually all courts require additional evidence of intent.119 Absent 
additional evidence, no burden of proof shifts to the employer, as 
it does in a disparate impact claim.120 Under these circumstances, 
a disparate impact plaintiff gains the benefit of a lighter burden 
of proof, and imposes a heavier burden on the defendant, who 
116 See Lopez v. City of Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 110–11 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(discussing business necessity under Title VII); Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing how plaintiff estab-
lishes disproportionality); see also Smith, 544 U.S. at 240–41 (discussing rea-
sonable factors other than age in the ADEA context). See generally Mack A. 
Player, Essay, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing? That Is Not 
the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819 (1997). 
117 Watson, 487 U.S. at 999 (1988) (plurality opinion) (quoting Furnco 
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)); see also McReynolds v. 
Sodexho Marriott Servs. Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting
Mozee v. Am. Com. Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1050 (7th Cir. 1991)) (“In 
order to sustain a subjective practice through a business necessity defense, 
therefore, an employer would have to argue that the subjectivity of the step is 
job-related—in other words, that something about the position requires the 
selector to make a subjective evaluation of the applicant’s abilities.”). 
118 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973) 
(remanded to determine if employer’s given reason for rejection was pretextual). 
119 See, e.g., id.
120 See, e.g., id.; Powell, 776 F. Supp. at 265 (citing Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 
Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008)). 
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must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the challenged 
practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.121
 Accordingly, courts that are reluctant to insist that plain-
tiffs distinguish among various subjective practices, risk creat-
ing a cause of action in conflict with the statute plaintiffs seek to 
enforce.122
V. HOW COURTS HAVE AVOIDED CONFLICTS BETWEEN DISPARATE 
TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT ALLEGATIONS
 Although courts recognize that a selection process may be 
analyzed as a single employment practice only if “the complain-
ing party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a 
respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separa-
tion for analysis,”123 some courts strain to avoid this result.124
Others avoid conflating selection criteria by distinguishing be-
tween the policy of neutrally delegating decisions, and how man-
agers exercise that delegated authority, which may or may not 
reflect discriminatory animus.125
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
122 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 533 (2015) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 
(2009) (“[B]efore rejecting a business justification—or, in the case of a gov-
ernmental entity, an analogous public interest—a court must determine that 
a plaintiff has shown that there is ‘an available alternative ... practice that 
has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.’”). 
123 Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i)). 
124 See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 
(9th Cir. 1985).
125 See generally Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008); 
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th 
Cir. 2012); Fox v. Bonneville Power Admin., 243 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In 
their complaint, Plaintiffs mentioned the ‘Collaboration’ process that gave 
management-level employees responsibility for reviewing and selecting can-
didates for promotion. Plaintiffs’ complaint discussed the emphasis placed on 
hiring women and minority workers. In other words, Plaintiffs contended that 
the policy of giving the employees in charge of the Collaboration process the 
discretion to make promotional decisions, combined with management’s em-
phasis on leveling the playing field for women and minorities, had a dispar-
ate impact on workers over 50 years old. Plaintiffs’ contentions are sufficient 
to state a disparate impact claim.”); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417 
2021] BLURRED LINES  455 
 If “delegation” is the neutral practice—that is, the employer’s 
delegation of decisions to individual managers—this greatly ex-
pands the group of employees potentially impacted by the em-
ployment practice, because all subsequent decisions ultimately 
spring from the employer’s delegation of authority.126 For exam-
ple, the Ninth Circuit found that “[an employer’s] policy of com-
mitting employment decisions to the subjective discretion of its 
managers is a specific employment practice subject to a dispar-
ate impact analysis.”127 As described by that court, the offending 
policy is permitting managers to exercise discretion, rather than 
the manner in which the discretion is exercised.128 Thus, man-
agers may be overt in their discriminatory animus, but the em-
ployer’s ostensibly neutral act of placing decisions in their hands 
permits their intentional acts to be analyzed through the lens of 
facial neutrality.129
 A similar delegation is described in a Seventh Circuit de-
cision.130 Judge Posner considers a hypothetical police department 
in which the department permits senior police officers to select 
junior officers with whom to partner.131 Suppose the senior offic-
ers choose junior officers matching their same demographic: 
There would be no intentional discrimination at the depart-
mental level, but the practice of allowing police officers to choose 
their partners could be challenged as enabling sexual and racial 
(9th Cir. 1990); Rudwall v. Blackrock, Inc., No. CO9-5176TEH, 2011 WL 
767965, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2011); Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., 144 F. 
App’x 603, 606–07 (9th Cir. 2005) (“When an employer combines subjective 
and objective criteria, the plaintiff is required to isolate and identify the spe-
cific offending employment practice.”). 
126 But see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 377 (2011). 
127 Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25. 
128 See also Fox, 243 F.3d 547 (Table) at *1. 
129 See Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25 (“Wells Fargo admits that the authority 
to determine which jobs would be eliminated and as to who would fill the re-
maining positions was delegated to the department heads. While the managers 
were instructed to consider an employee’s performance and longevity, Wells 
Fargo admits that the process of job elimination and restaffing was otherwise 
discretionary and subjective. Accordingly, as in Watson, Wells Fargo’s policy 
of committing employment decisions to the subjective discretion of its manag-
ers is a specific employment practice subject to a disparate impact analysis.”).
130 McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489. 
131 Id.
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discrimination—as having in the jargon of discrimination law 
a “disparate impact” on a protected group—and if a discrimi-
natory effect was proved, then to avoid an adverse judgment 
the department would have to prove that the policy was essential 
to the department’s mission.132
 Of course, in both cases the employer would be liable for 
intentional discrimination by their managers because these man-
agers are exercising authority delegated by the employer.133 But 
according to two Courts of Appeals, the same employment decisions 
create both disparate impact and disparate treatment liability.134
 The problem with “delegation” as the facially neutral practice 
is that the exception swallows the rule.135 In virtually all instances, 
an employer’s decision to delegate authority is subjective—someone 
ultimately must decide who stays and who goes, and on what 
basis.136 Typically, the delegation is with benign intent.137 “[L]eft 
to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely 
most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—
would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring 
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.”138 Yet, 
should the delegatees act in a discriminatory manner, courts fol-
lowing the Seventh and Ninth Circuits would recognize a disparate 
impact claim, although ultimate decision-makers may have in-
tentionally discriminated in their decision-making process.139
132 Id. This hypothetical obscures the fact that there were two policies at-
tacked in this case. One was objective—considering a broker’s existing volume of 
business in assigning new accounts; the other was subjective—permitting 
brokers to form “teams” that work together based on the predilections of team 
members. The hypothetical relates solely to the latter. See id. at 488–89. 
133 See id. at 489 (Seventh Circuit view); Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25 (Ninth 
Circuit view). 
134 See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489; Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25. 
135 See Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat's 
Paw: Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal An-
tidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383, 407–09 (2008) (highlighting 
the lenient approaches in the Fourth and Tenth circuits); see, e.g., Rose, 902 
F.2d at 1424–25. 
136 See Befort & Olig, supra note 135, at 407–09; see, e.g., Rose, 902 F.2d at 
1424–25.
137 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011). 
138 Id.
139 See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 489; Rose, 902 F.2d at 1424–25. 
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 A similar conundrum results when courts are too quick to 
find that an employer’s decision-making process is inseparable 
for analysis. 
Where the system of promotion is pervaded by a lack of uni-
form criteria, criteria that are subjective as well as variable, 
discretionary placements and promotions, the failure to follow 
set procedures and the absence of written policies or justifica-
tions for promotional decisions, the court is not required to 
“pinpoint particular aspects of [the system]” that are unfavor-
able to [the protected group].140
When a court determines an employer’s delegation deci-
sions are inseparable, and therefore may be analyzed as one 
employment practice for purposes of a disparate impact claim, 
courts admit bottom-line analyses of the ultimate decisions.141
 The Second Circuit has considered most thoroughly the 
issues arising when subjective decisions conflate with the ultimate 
RIF decision.142 The leading case is Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 
Div. of W.R. Grace & Co.143 Maresco involved a RIF accompany-
ing the consolidation of two offices.144 The plaintiff sought to re-
cover under both a disparate impact and disparate treatment 
theory of discrimination.145 The court observed:  
Both the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories 
can be invoked in a given case to establish ADEA liability, 
since they are simply alternative doctrinal premises for a 
statutory violation .... We do not believe, however, that the 
disparate impact theory provides any significant analytical 
contribution in this case. 
The facially neutral employment practice that Maresco invokes as 
the premise for disparate impact liability coalesces with the 
discharge which he claims to have constituted disparate treat-
ment. Because “[e]vidence of the employer’s subjective intent 
140 Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1992 WL 295957, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1992) (citations omitted). 
141 Id.
142 See Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, Div. of W.R. Grace & Co., 964 F.2d 
106, 111 (2d Cir. 1992). 
143 See generally id.
144 Id. at 107–08. 
145 Id.
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to discriminate” must be provided to support a claim of dis-
parate treatment, ... allowing the disparate impact doctrine to 
be invoked as Maresco proposes would simply provide a means to 
circumvent the subjective intent requirement in any dispar-
ate treatment case.146
 As the Second Circuit recognizes, a disparate treatment 
plaintiff must present proof of intent, which usually requires ad-
ditional evidence beyond demonstrating a statistical difference.147
In contrast, a disparate impact plaintiff, once freed of identifying 
any neutral practice, can present prima facie proof based solely 
on a statistical difference.148 Thus, Second Circuit courts are 
alert to pleadings that conflate intentional and neutral theories, 
viewing these pleadings as “nonsensically” alleging policies that 
are both neutral, yet intentionally discriminatory.149 Accordingly, 
these courts follow the “Maresco rule” and dismiss the disparate 
impact claim.150
 Barrett v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.151 illustrates that rea-
soning:
These latter two allegations [claims relating to the alleged 
disparate impact of manager performance assessments], though 
146 Id. at 115 (internal citations omitted). 
147 Id. (“[T]he eight discharges that occurred in connection with the divi-
sional consolidation at issue in this case are unlikely to provide an adequate 
basis for the sort of statistical analysis frequently employed in disparate im-
pact cases.”). 
148 See Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 140 (3d Cir. 
2010); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988); see 
also text accompanying supra note 21.  
149 Hunt v. Tektronix, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 998, 1009 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); see also
Verney v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (finding “nonsensical” 
plaintiff’s contention that her employer’s alleged policy of intentionally dis-
criminating against women caused a disparate impact on women), aff’d, 79 F.3d 
1140 (3d Cir. 1996); Zawacki v. Realogy Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281 (D. 
Conn. 2009) (“Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant’s procedures in conducting 
the RIFs were nothing more than a cover for behind-the-scenes, intentional 
discrimination against its older employees. There is no allegation of a facially 
neutral practice or policy that fell more harshly on the protected group.”) (citing 
Maresco, 964 F.2d at 115). 
150 Hunt, 952 F. Supp. at 1009; see also Verney, 872 F. Supp. at 193; 
Zawacki, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 281; supra text accompanying note 149.  
151 39 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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styled as disparate impact claims, are really claims of dispar-
ate treatment. The gravamen of the SAC on this point is that 
managers discriminated against women by giving them un-
justifiably low performance evaluations and placing them on 
probation without reason for doing so, which resulted in re-
duced compensation. Although, according to the SAC, Defendants’ 
policy of giving weight to these discriminatory assessments 
caused the discrimination, the real source of the disparity is 
the managers’ allegedly discriminatory reviews and probation 
decisions. Accepting the SAC’s factual allegations as true, this 
is not a situation where Defendants followed a facially-neutral 
practice that created a disparity; this is a situation in which 
managers intentionally treated male and female employees 
differently. That is a disparate treatment claim.152
 The court then invoked the Maresco rule, finding the claims 
coalesced, and analyzed the performance evaluation process and 
assessments as a disparate treatment claim.153
 Similarly, in Hunt v. Tektronix, Inc.,154 the plaintiff alleged 
the employer “maintained a discriminatory policy and/or practice 
of terminating older individuals within the protected class in the 
sales force, to achieve an overall younger sales force[,]” and this 
“discriminatory policy and/or practice of terminating older em-
ployees had a disparate impact” on each of the plaintiffs.155 The 
court dismissed the disparate impact claim, citing a Pennsylvania 
court’s description of a neutral, intentionally discriminatory pol-
icy as “nonsensical.”156
152 Id. at 438. 
153 Id.
154 952 F. Supp. 998 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 
155 Id. at 1009.
156 Id. (citing Verney v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1995) 
(finding “nonsensical” plaintiff’s contention that her employer’s alleged policy 
of intentionally discriminating against women caused a disparate impact on 
women), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1996)) (“In their responsive memorandum, 
plaintiffs contend that the specific employment practice ‘at issue’ is Tektronix’s 
layoff policy. However, plaintiffs do not allege that the policy itself, applied as 
written, causes a disparate impact. They allege that it is Tektronix’ failure to 
follow the policy that causes a disparate impact. This too is nonsensical. To 
the extent the plaintiffs assert that Tektronix has diverged from the policy 
and used unauthorized criteria in layoff determinations, then their claim 
merges with their disparate treatment theory that Tektronix intended to dis-
charge the older employees in favor of the new ones. Plaintiffs’ disparate im-
pact claim is dismissed.”). 
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 Second Circuit courts also give short shrift to allegations 
that a disparate impact is caused by managers who selectively 
depart from a company’s stated policy.157 Indeed, in a New York 
district court case, a plaintiff alleged his employer’s performance 
criteria to select which branch managers would remain employed 
had a disparate impact on older workers.158 Importantly, however, 
the plaintiff simultaneously argued that the employer “in fact, 
chose different and subjective criterion [sic] than required by the 
guidelines to make its decisions on who would remain as branch 
managers.”159 The court found this was solely a disparate treat-
ment, not a disparate impact, claim.160 “It is clear, then, that plain-
tiff is not alleging that application of a facially-neutral policy had 
a disparate impact, but that [the employer] deliberately singled out 
older employees for termination or transfer. That does not state 
a disparate-impact claim.”161
 Critically, the Maresco rule potentially sweeps more broadly 
than the oxymoron of “neutrally intentional” conduct.162 Its logic 
suggests that when the effect of subjective practices is indistin-
guishable from the ultimate employment decision, the disparate 
impact and treatment theories are fatally inconsistent.163 “[A]s 
the court in Maresco noted, a disparate impact claim may not pro-
ceed where the premises supporting it coalesce with the premises 





161 Id.; see also Hunt, 952 F. Supp. At 1009; supra note 156. But see Martin 
v. Coinmach Corp., No. 15-CV-8137(AJN)(SN), 2016 WL 6996182, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2016) (“Drawing all inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, the 
company’s policy of making all merit increases dependent entirely on the dis-
cretion of a white supervisor, in the absence of any objective criteria to cabin 
or direct that individual’s judgment is a ‘specific employment practice,’ as the 
term is used in Watson. It is not relevant that Plaintiffs also allege that Mr. 
Tolkup did in fact engage in such intentional discrimination, as long as they 
can conceivably establish a prima facie case that Coinmach’s merit raise policy 
lead to a statistically significant disparate impact even in the absence of in-
tentional discrimination.” (internal footnotes omitted)). 
162 Brown v. City of New York, No. 16 CV 1106(NG) (RER), 2017 WL 
1102677, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017) (quoting Maresco, 964 F.2d at 115). 
163 Id.
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supporting a disparate treatment claim, as such a use of disparate 
impact doctrine would ‘simply provide a means to circumvent the 
subjective intent requirement in any disparate treatment case.’”164
 The logic runs as follows: if an employer’s decision to dele-
gate authority to managers is the ostensibly neutral act, then the 
managers themselves act either intentionally or neutrally.165 If 
managers are intentionally discriminatory, then their discrimi-
natory animus is the proximate cause of the biased decisions, 
not the employer’s neutral decision to grant managers individual 
decision-making authority.166 In effect, the manager’s bias is a 
superseding cause167 of the employer’s discriminatory selections, 
for which the employer is liable as respondeat superior.168 As in 
tort law, the manager’s wrongdoing breaks the chain of causation 
initiated by the facially neutral policy.169 On the other hand, if 
managers act neutrally, then the claim is properly pled as hav-
ing a disparate impact, because both the employer’s delegation and 
the manager’s actions are facially neutral.170 Accordingly, liabil-
ity may be found under one theory or the other, but not both.171
164 Id. at *5. 
165 Id. at *6. 
166 Id.
167 See Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d 605, 618 (5th Cir. 
2018) (describing the tort doctrine of intervening or superseding cause). 
168 Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 231 (D.D.C. 2015).  
It is hornbook law that ‘[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, an employer may be held liable for the acts of his em-
ployees committed within the scope of their employment.’ ... A 
claim for vicarious liability under a respondeat superior theory 
consists, therefore, of two prongs: an employer-employee rela-
tionship and a tortious act committed by the employee within 
the scope of his employment. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
169 But see Horowitz v. AT&T, Inc., No. 17-4827 (BRM)(LHG), 2019 WL 
8275258, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2019) (“The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the 
process for giving surplussed employees the opportunity to apply for new po-
sitions is on its face neutral. The subcomponents of that policy, i.e., giving 
managers information regarding years of service and surplus status to use in 
exercising their discretion as to hiring can be viewed as infecting that process 
with age-related bias.”).
170 Brown, 2017 WL at *3. 
171 Id. at *5. 
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 Plaintiffs nevertheless are permitted to plead in the alter-
native if they can skirt the “nonsensical” claim of neutrally/inten-
tionally discriminating.172 Thus, in Barrett, the court ultimately 
concluded that a plaintiff plausibly could plead disparate impact 
and disparate treatment simultaneously, but could not prevail 
simultaneously under each theory:173
Nor is it problematic that the SAC identifies one practice in 
support of both a pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim 
and a disparate impact claim. Of course, were the case to go to 
trial, the manner in which the Company assigns base salaries 
cannot support both claims: the alleged disparities in female 
employees’ base salaries are either caused by intentional dis-
crimination or by a facially-neutral policy that has a disparate 
impact on women. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
expressly permit pleading in the alternative ..., Plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged that the manner in which the Company 
sets base pay has a disparate impact on women.174
 This makes the most sense because the actual impact of a 
neutral policy is impossible to gauge if individual discriminators 
intervene and influence the results. Imagine a facially neutral 
pencil and paper test that is challenged as having a disparate 
impact. A much higher fraction of males pass than females. But 
suppose the graders are biased against women and therefore erase 
female employees’ correct answers and replace them with wrong 
answers. A disproportionate number of women fail, but the fail-
ure rate is not the fault of the test. Because of the discriminating 
graders, it is impossible to know who would have passed were the 
test graded fairly. 
 Under these circumstances, to hold the employer liable under 
a disparate impact theory is not just wrong, it may be counter-
productive.175 One of the remedies, upon finding a disparate im-
pact, is to enjoin the use of the test, either by substituting a less 
discriminatory alternative or eliminating testing entirely.176 How-
ever, there is no telling whether the test, if properly graded by 
172 Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 407, 436–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
173 Id.
174 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
175 See NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 707 F. Supp. 2d 520, 530 
(D.N.J. 2010). 
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; see NAACP, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
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non-biased actors, would have an adverse impact for female em-
ployees. To be sure, if the employer is responsible for hiring dis-
criminatory graders, then the employer will be liable under a 
theory of intentional discrimination.177 But, under these hypo-
thetical circumstances, it would be “nonsensical” to hold that the 
test in question must be replaced.178 This biased-graders exam-
ple also emphasizes how a disparate impact/disparate treatment 
case should be submitted to a jury. Because the discriminatory 
motives of the graders or, more realistically, managers, can un-
dermine even the most carefully vetted policy or practice,179 the 
jury first should be asked whether those who implemented the 
policy acted with discriminatory animus. 
CONCLUSION
 Although courts strive to distinguish elements of decision 
making that allegedly cause a disparate impact, not all decision-
making processes are readily parsed, as this discussion of RIFs 
demonstrates.180 In those instances, the disparate impact theory 
of discrimination devolves into a theory of strict liability, which, 
subject to affirmative defenses, confers liability based solely on 
disproportionate outcomes.181 Yet, Title VII and Supreme Court 
cases prohibit finding liability based solely on a disparity in an 
employer’s bottom-line statistics.182 Although Title VII provides 
an exception when various facets of an employer’s ultimate deci-
sion are inseparable, courts have failed to provide clear guidance 
regarding how and when this exception applies.183 In analyzing 
disparate treatment claims, some courts strain to conclude that 
an employer’s decision-making process—more specifically its de-
cision to delegate decision-making to individual managers—is 
incapable of separation, and therefore must be analyzed as one 
177 Barrett, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 438.  
178 Verney v. Dodaro, 872 F. Supp. 188, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1995). 
179 Brown v. City of New York, No. 16 CV 1106(NG) (RER), 2017 WL 
1102677, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017). 
180 See supra Part II. 
181 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
182 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). 
183 See supra Part V. 
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practice.184 Other courts are more likely to conclude that the 
employer’s decision to delegate cannot coexist with allegations of 
intentional discrimination by those who exercise delegated au-
thority.185 However, one conclusion seems clear: a plaintiff should 
not be able to prevail under both a disparate impact and disparate 
treatment theory challenging the same subjective decisions. This 
especially is true when selection criteria, although subjective, never-
theless may be more quantified and therefore separately analyzed. 
184 See Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002); see also text 
accompanying supra note 123. 
185 See Am. Fed'n of Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1985); see also text accompanying supra note 124. 
